This paper examines the investment behaviour of an incumbent and a potential entrant that are competing for a patent with a stochastic payo . We incorporate asymmetric information into the model by assuming that the challenger has complete information about the incumbent whereas the latter does not know the precise value of its opponent's investment cost. We nd that even a small probability of being preempted gives the informationally-disadvantaged rm an incentive t o i n vest at the breakeven point where it is indi erent b e t ween investing and being preempted. By investing ine ciently early to protect its market share, the incumbent gives up not only its option to delay the investment, but also reduces the value of the rm by an amount that increases with the investment cost incurred and the potential loss of market share. The investment behaviour of the challenger is the same as under complete information, namely the challenger`epsilon preempts' the incumbent, if optimal to do so. JEL Nos.: D82, C73, G13.
Introduction
Seminal papers by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) , McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit (1989) stress that investing under uncertainty and irreversibility i n volves sacricing the option to invest in the future. The optimal point t o invest should balance the pro ts foregone by delaying the investment against the option value relinquished when the investment is made. 1 This leads to a decision rule under which an investment is made when its net present value (NPV) is strictly positive. The execution of the investment is delayed beyond the traditional neoclassical Marshallian breakeven threshold. Managers that are guided by the traditional breakeven rule have therefore at times been criticised of acting in a myopic`now or never' fashion whereby they destroy the company's exibility a n d option value of waiting.
A numberof recent papers have, however, argued that the potential for rms to delay i n vestments may be limited if they are operating in an environment where rst mover's advantages, preemption and competition are important (e.g., Smets (1991) , Grenadier (1996) , Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) , Mason and Weeds (2000) and Weeds (2000) , among others). Consequently, the threat of preemption may reduce the rms' exibility to delay and the option value of waiting. Smets (1991) and Grenadier (1996) , for example, show that, when two rms contemplate to enter in a market, the more e cient of the two will preempt the weaker rm by entering an instant before the breakeven threshold of the less e cient rm. 2 This means that if both rms are identical all option value of waiting to invest will be destroyed and entry happens at the competitive breakeven threshold. If one rm is more e cient t h a n t h e other, then the more e cient rm will, by`epsilon preempting', still preserve some option value of waiting. 3 In a fairly competitive environment, it is to be expected that the threat of preemption will lead to ine ciently early investment and destroy most option value of waiting to invest. Preemptive considerations therefore seem to bring the investment rule under uncertainty and irreversibility more or less back in 1 The optimal timing of an investment is therefore similar to the optimal exercise of an American option on a dividend paying stock. 2 They also show t h a t i n s o m e c a s e s s i m ultaneous entry is possible (even when both rms are not identical), but this equilibrium is less relevant for our paper. 3 The concept of epsilon preemption is the one proposed, for example, in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) : if a rm can invest at time t and thus put its rival at a disadvantage, then the latter has an incentive to preempt the former by i n vesting just prior to time t.
line with the neoclassical Marshallian investment rule, and results are in the spirit of some in uential papers on technological innovation. For example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) , after examining rms engaged in games with complete information, reach the conclusion that competition may e v en result in excessive speed in R&D. In essence, the incentive to preempt rivals and thus deter their entries can drive a r m t o invest earlier in order to gain the rst-mover advantage. Reinganum (1983) notes that actual and potential new entrants play a crucial role in stimulating technical progress, both as direct sources of innovation and as spurs to existing industry members. ' Gilbert and Harris (1984) show that preemptive equilibria are characterised by zero pro t on every new investment. That is, in the absence of a binding contract between the agents, competition can completely dissipate the economic rent.
The above papers share, however, the common feature that rms are assumed to be completely informed about each other. As this assumption may often be violated in reality, some recent papers have started analyzing the exercise of real options under alternative information structures. The model closest to ours is by Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) . 4 They introduce incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of rms that have the opportunity to enter into a new market. Firms know their own cost of entry but only know the distribution of their competitors' investment costs. They show that the optimal investment trigger may lie anywhere between the zero-NPV trigger (the so-called Marshallian trigger) and the rm's optimal monopolistic, non-competitive trigger (referred to as the non-strategic option trigger), depending on the fear of preemption implied by the distribution of the competitors' costs. Furthermore, higher product market uncertainty leads to more delay, conform to what is predicted by the real options paradigm. The main implication therefore is that incomplete information preserves some option value of waiting 4 Grenadier (1999) describes a model in which rms learn about the investment p a yo from the actions of other agents, i.e., each rm has a private signal about the payo of the investment that is revealed when it acts. Information revelation allows rms that have not yet acted to update their information about the value of the underlying investment. This paper is, however, not directly relevant for our discussion as the rms' investment p a yo is not a ected by the order in which rms exercise. Moreover, his model is more relevant to describe second mover's advantages. A standard application of his model is the exploration of oil when two or more rms have adjacent tracts of land that may contain an oil deposit. Firms then face a trade-o between the bene ts of drilling and potentially obtaining oil earlier and the bene ts of waiting for other rms to drill rst and reveal information about the size of the oil deposit.
and therefore tends to restore, at least to some extent, the real options paradigm for capital budgeting in the presence of preemption and competition. This paper aims to contribute further to the debate on the validity of real options theory in the presence of preemption by considering the case of asymmetric information. In particular, we consider the situation where one rm has complete information about its rival, whereas the latter has incomplete information about its opponent's investment cost. As such the asymmetric information case is an intermediate case between complete and incomplete information, and the interesting question is whether investment behaviour under uncertainty and competition in such an environment brings us closer to the real options paradigm, or closer to the traditional zero-NPV rule. From the above discussion, one would expect to obtain the former (latter) outcome if the incomplete (complete) information component dominates.
A second di erentiating factor from many previous real options papers is that we consider an asymmetrical race. 5 Similar to Gilbert and Newbery (1982) we consider a patent race between an incumbent and a potential entrant. Entry into the monopolised market can begained only by patenting a substitute for the incumbent's present product. 6 The incumbent can therefore prevent e n try by preemptively patenting the substitute. The model allows us to examine how informational asymmetries a ect the persistence of a monopoly and therefore contributes to previous work on monopoly persistence by Newbery (1978) , Gilbert and Newbery (1982) , Reinganum (1983) , Harris and Vickers (1985) , and Leininger (1991) , among others.
In this paper we assume that the potential entrant knows everything about the incumbent, whereas the incumbent does not know t h e e n trant's exact investment cost but only the distribution it is drawn from. We could, of course, reformulate the model to allow t h e e n trant to be the informationally disadvantaged rm but chose not to do so for the following reasons. 7 First, the incumbent company m a y be a larger, possibly listed company. Information about the incumbent may therefore be more publicly available than for the entrant. Second, the incumbent may be facing a whole pool of potential challengers, all with varying costs of entry. However, only one of these challengers may e ective l y s e e k e n try. The incumbent m a y not be able to identify this challenger and may therefore have t o m a k e a conjecture about the distribution of the investment cost of the challenger that will e ectively seek entry. Finally, note that most of the existing literature on oligopolistic entry deterrence has typically assumed asymmetric information with respect to the market or the production process (e.g., the level of demand or cost of production) rather than the characteristics of the market players. 8 Those papers have therefore typically assumed the incumbent to bebetter informed.
Our results are as follows. We nd that the slightest possibility of preemption will make the informationally disadvantaged rm act at the point where it is indi erent between investing and beingpreempted (referred to as the strategic Marshallian trigger). The incumbent's investment trigger is therefore not in uenced at all by economic uncertainty, which lends support to the neoclassical Marshallian theory. If the incumbent's second patent is not put to commercial use then its investment cost is a pure entry deterrence cost, and it may w eaken the incumbent if it has to deter entry on a regular basis. Therefore, the informational disadvantage makes it more di cult for the incumbent to protect its monopoly position in the long run. We further show that in some cases the incumbent may be able to learn about its opponent's entry cost if the latter does not act when market conditions become increasingly more favorable. However, when challengers are reasonably e cient, the value of learning will typically besmall or non-existent. A comparative analysis shows that the informationally disadvantaged rm is worse o under asymmetric information than under complete or incomplete information. For the completely informed entrant, the outcome is the same as under complete information since it will try to epsilon preempt the incumbent. Some of the entrant's option value of waiting may be preserved if the entrant is su ciently e cient compared to the incumbent.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.1 we rst specify the normal form of the game by deriving the payo to the incumbent and the challenger in case either of them wins the patent race. Section 2.2 derives each rm's value and investment threshold when it faces no competition. Section 2.3 formalises the issues of asymmetric information, learning and competition, and solves for each rm's strategic investment threshold and its corresponding rm value in equilibrium. Section 3 analyses the main results. Section 4 compares the results under asymmetric information with the ones that would be obtained under complete and incomplete information. The last section concludes.
A Strategic Investment Model
Consider a patent race game played by a n i n c u m bent and a potential entrant. Specifically, the incumbent is serving a monopolised market under the threat of a challenger who wants to enter the market. 9 Assume that before entry occurs, the incumbent produces only one product that has a patent of in nite duration. 10 Entry into the monopolised market can be gained only by patenting a substitute for the incumbent's present product. The costs of acquiring this new patent are K i for the incumbent and K e for the entrant.
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As soon as the patent is acquired, the second product will be launched without any further cost. Depending on whether and by whom the second patent has been acquired, the market structure will be (1) a monopoly with only one product, (2) a monopoly with two products, or (3) a duopoly with two products. In order to focus purely on the role of the patent in the persistence of the monopoly, w e assume that there are no other barriers to entry. In particular, there are no capacity constraints, no production costs, and hence no returns to scale. Furthermore, since there are no production costs, no rm will want to exit the market once it has started producing the rst or second product. 12 Assume that before the second product is launched the incumbent makes a pro t 9 This line of research is also studied by, for example, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Harris and Vickers (1985) . 10 In the US, patents are granted for a term of 17 years (14 years for design patents). Since the model developed in this paper uses option pricing techniques to value patents, patents can, from a practical viewpoint, safely be regarded as in nite maturity (perpetual) options. Moreover, the additional complexity required of nite maturity m o d e l s i s n o t w arranted by the small gain in accuracy. 11 We denote parameters, variables or probability distributions related to the incumbent and the potential entrant b y the subscripts i and e respectively.
of 1i x t per period of time, where x t is a stochastic variable representing demand shocks and 1i is a strictly positive constant. Suppose x t follows a geometric Brownian motion: dx t = x t dt + x t dW t (1) where is the growth rate parameter, is the proportional variance parameter, and dW t is the increment of the standard Wiener process. If the incumbent succeeds in patenting the substitute, its pro t ow becomes 2i x t . On the other hand, if an entrant acquires the new patent, the incumbent's pro t ow becomes i x t and the entrant will accumulate pro ts at a rate e x t . We focus on the case where the incumbent (i) becomes worse o if entry happens and (ii) makes more pro t by producing two products than only one. In other words, 2i > 1i > i . This is the economically more interesting and relevant case.
The above patent race game can besummarised as follows (with the pro t ows of the agents shown in parentheses).
Time

? -6
The incumbent ( 1i ) produces the rst product.
Entry is deterred: the incumbent ( 2i ) produces two products. or Entry happens: the entrant ( e ) competes with the incumbent ( i ).
Derivation of the Payo
In this subsection we derive the payo matrix of the patent game. To begin, we calculate the incumbent's and entrant's values of the patents on products 1 and 2, bothof which are assumed to have in nite duration.
The patent on the rst product is already owned by the incumbent and therefore relevant to the incumbent only. Assume that the value of the incumbent producing product 1 is comprised completely of the patent. This value is denoted by N 1t . Under the assumption of risk neutrality, investors are willing to invest in the incumbent's rm only when its total return (i.e., the pro t ow plus the anticipated capital gain) equals the return they can get from investing the same amount of money in a riskless bondwhich yields a constant interest rate r. Therefore 
Note that the solution of N 1t may be obtained alternatively in a probabilistic way b y directly working out the expectation E t R 1 t 1i x s exp(;r(s ; t))ds ].
13 If x t ever touched 0, the state variable would remain at that level forever (i.e., 0 is an absorbing barrier). Correspondingly, the value of the patent on product 1 would also be 0. Since < 0, x t goes to in nity a s x t tends to zero. To a void the value on the right-hand side of equation (4) diverging, we must therefore set A 1 = 0 . Note that if we introduced a x e d production cost then the term A 1 x would represent the value of future suspension or exit options. Since there is no such c o s t i n our model, it is never optimal for rms to leave the market. That is, the option value of exit is 0.
14 The component A 2 x t represents the possibility of speculative bubbles as x t ! 1 . People might price an asset more than its fundamental value if they expect to be able to resell it later and realise a su ciently large capital gain. We rule out this possibility of speculative bubbles, so N 1 (x t ) consists only of the fundamental value 1ixt r; .
The Value of the Patent on Product 2
Both the incumbent and the potential entrant want to acquire the patent on the second product when the state variable is high enough. We now calculate the value of this patent to each agent.
Following the argument above, it is easy to show that in a duopoly the value of the second patent to the entrant is e x t r ; :
The incumbent's incremental pro t ow from the new patent is 2i x t ; 1i x t = ( 2i ; 1i )x t . Therefore the incremental value of the second patent to the incumbent is ( 2i ; 1i )x t r ; :
The incumbent's loss due to new entry is i x t ; 1i x t = ( i ; 1i )x t per period. This corresponds to a negative present value of ( i ; 1i )x t r ; : (8) Taking into account the cost of acquiring the patent, we can summarise in the following matrix the payo s to the incumbent and the challenger, depending on who acquires the new patent: 
Value of the Non-strategic Claim to Innovate
In his pioneering article, Arrow (1962) asks: \What is the gain from innovation to a rm that is the only one to undertake R&D, given that its innovation is protected by a patent of unlimited duration?" Here we will attempt to isolate the`pure' incentive t o innovate, i.e., that which is independent o f a n y strategic considerations of preemptive innovation. In the next subsection we discuss the case where the rm is competing with a rival.
Proposition 1 The non-strategic`pure' value from innovation to the incumbent and the entrant is given by: V j (x t jx jn ) = j x jn ; K j ] x t x jn ! (j = i e) (9) where i 2i ; 1i r; and e e r; . The optimal non-strategic exercise trigger is given by:
In particular, the respective non-strategic triggers for the incumbent and entrant are:
x en = (r ; )K e ( ; 1) e (11) Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 illustrates how the option valuation approach leads to an investment trigger which is drastically di erent from the neoclassical Marshallian trigger, which is de ned as:
De nition 1 The Marshallian trigger, x jm , is de ned as the trigger at which the investor breaks even, ignoring strategic behaviour, i.e. the trigger for which j x jm ; K j = 0 or equivalently x jm = K j j . Such triggers for the incumbent and the challenger respectively are given by: The triggers illustrate an important di erence between the incumbent's and the entrant's incentives to undertake R&D. One can easily verify that @x in @ 1i > 0. Hence, increasing the incumbent's pre-innovation pro t reduces its incentive to undertake R&D. This is the familiar Arrow (1962) `replacement e ect'. It tends to lower the incumbent's R&D expenditures compared to the entrant's, who has no pre-innovation pro ts. Finally, note that if rms were to act in the above non-strategic way, then the monopoly would persist if x in < x en , 2i ; 1i K i > e Ke . The determining factor for winning the innovation`race' is therefore the ratio of the coe cient of incremental pro t ow to the cost of patenting.
Value of the Strategic Claim to Innovate
In this subsection we incorporate fear of preemption into the rms' investment decisions. The patent game considered in this paper has the following extensive form: two p l a yers are involved (the incumbent and the challenger), and the player that acts rst acquires the patent (note that action is triggered at a su ciently high level of x t ). The game can therefore bein two possible states: either nobody has acted yet, or one rm has acted (i.e. patented the innovation) and the game ends. The normal (or strategic) form of the game has been given in the payo matrix of Section 2.1, which summarises the payo s for both agents according to their actions.
Analogous to the previous subsection, we now de ne for comparative purposes à strategic' or`competitive' Marshallian trigger which takes into account the cost of preemption.
De nition 2 Firm j's (j = i e) strategic Marshallian trigger, x jc , is de ned as the state at which the investor is indi erent between investing or being preempted, i.e. the trigger for which: j x jc ; K j = j x jc or equivalently x jc = K j j ; j , where i = i ; 1i r; and e = 0 . Such triggers for the incumbent and the challenger are respectively given by:
r;
x ec = K e e r; = x em (13) De nition 2 illustrates how the strategic Marshallian triggers depend critically on the parameters 2i i and e . It is reasonable to assume that a monopolist does not make less pro ts than two non-colluding duopolists, i.e. 2i i + e . 15 This property is called the`e ciency e ect' and is discussed by Gilbert and Newbery (1982) , for instance. It states that the`preemptive' payo to innovation, that is the di erence between winning the patent and letting the rival win it, is bigger for the incumbent ( 2i ; i ) than for the entrant ( e ;0). Therefore, the e ciency e ect gives the incumbent a bigger incentive to innovate because a monopoly is more e cient a t making pro ts.
The impact of the e ciency e ect can beillustrated by comparing both agents' strategic Marshallian triggers. The monopoly will persist if x ic < x em , or equivalently if
Ke . Hence, the determining factor for winning the innovation race is now the ratio of the coe cient of the preemptive pro t ow (and not the incremental pro t ow as in the non-strategic case) to the cost of patenting. The e ciency e ect implies that 2i ; i e and therefore gives a comparative advantage to the incumbent, which contributes to the persistence of the monopoly.
We now consider the e ect of asymmetric information on a duopolistic rm's investment behaviour. The information is asymmetric in the sense that the incumbent's investment cost is known by the challenger but the incumbent only knows the probability distribution of the challenger's cost. This is formalised in Assumption 1:
Assumption 1 The incumbent's investment cost, K i , is public knowledge and known to the potential challenger. However, the challenger's cost, K e , is known only to itself. The incumbent knows that this cost, K e , is drawn from a probability distribution G(K e ) that has a continuous probability density function (pdf) G 0 (K e ) and a positive support K L K U ].
The following assumption merely de nes the outcome of the race for the case where both rms want to invest at the same time and there i s a t i e . Assumption 2 If both rms act simultaneously, each rm acquires the patent with probability 1/2. 15 Indeed, if the monopolist wishes it can always duplicate the actions of non-colluding duopolists.
As is usual in games with asymmetric information, we rst analyse the optimal investment rule for the informed agent ( t h e c hallenger), and subsequently derived the optimal strategy of the incumbent.
Investment Rule for the Entrant
The investment rule for the entrant i s v ery simple: the entrant will always act before the incumbent and patent the second product if it is pro table to do so. The condition ensuring that the entrant makes a pro table investment is that it must not act at a state lower than its Marshallian trigger, x em . If the incumbent's strategic trigger, x is , is higher than the entrant's non-strategic trigger, x en , then the entrant will act at the non-strategic trigger, x en , and fully exploit all option value of waiting. If, however, the incumbent's strategic trigger, x is , i s l o wer than the entrant's non-strategic trigger but higher than the entrant's Marshallian trigger, then the entrant w i l l -preempt the incumbent by acting at x ; is = x is ; (where is an in nitesimally small number). Figure 1 illustrates the entrant's investment rule. We plot the entrant's nonstrategic, strategic and Marshallian triggers as a function of its entry cost. For the moment we assume that the incumbent's strategic trigger, x is , is exogenously given. Both the non-strategic and the Marshallian triggers of the entrant are, as usual, strictly increasing linear functions of the entry cost, i.e., x en = The thick k i n k ed line represents the entrant's strategic investment trigger, x es , as a function of its own investment cost, K e , when the incumbent's investment trigger, x is , is exogenously given. The trigger, x es , falls within the cone formed by the entrant's Marshallian breakeven threshold, x em , and its non-strategic option threshold, x en . Given the incumbent's strategic investment trigger, x is , the entrant w i l l act at the non-strategic trigger, x en , if K e < Figure 1 also illustrates the relationship between the strategic triggers of the incumbent and the entrant. By choosing an investment threshold, x is , the incumbent e ectively sets a cut-o level of entry cost, K e , above which entry cannot happen, i.e. K e exis r; . An entrant with cost lying between ;1 K e and K e will act at x ; is . 16 A more cost-e cient entrant whose cost is smaller than ;1 K e will act at its non-strategic trigger, x en .
Before the state variable, x t , r e a c hes the incumbent's strategic trigger, the incumbent might b e able to improve its conjecture about the challenger's cost distribution by monitoring the maximum level of the stochastic process,x t (i.e.x t maxfx j0 tg).
Consider the case where K L < ;1 K e . As the state variable increases and explores new territory,x t moves up as well. Ifx t becomes so high that ( ;1) ext (r; ) > K L and 16 For the rest of this paper, we will denote x is ; by x ; is for simplicity.
no challenger has acted (at its non-strategic trigger, x en ), then the incumbent learns that the challenger's cost cannot be situated in the interval h K L ( ;1) ext (r; ) i , otherwise entry would have happened. With this learning, the incumbent updates its conjecture about the probability distribution of the rival's cost by Bayes' rule:
G 0 (K e jK) = G 0 (K e ) 1 ; G(K) (14) or equivalently, G(K e jK) = G(K e ) ; G(K) 1 ; G(K) (15) whereK min max K L ( ;1) ext (r; )
;1 K e is the updated lower boundary of the support of the challenger's cost distribution. 17 In essence, equation (14) says that the updated pdf of the challenger's cost is the original pdf scaled up by the factor 1;G(K), so that the updated pdf integrates to unity. Note that 1;G(K) corresponds to the sum of the probability masses in the interval K 1). (16) where the entrant's strategic investment trigger, x es , and the proba b i l i t y o f t h e e n t r ant winning the patent game, p, are given by: : entry happens at x es = x is or the monopoly persists, each with probability 1=2 (i.e., p = 1 =2) if K e < K e : entry is not possible (i.e., p = 0 )
Proof: See Appendix. 17 Alternatively, we will use G(K e jx t ) to represent G(K e jK) when emphasising that the incumbent's conjecture is improved by observingx t .
Investment Rule for the Incumbent
We n o w discuss how to nd the investment trigger and claim value of the incumbent. In our model the incumbent's strategic trigger, x is , is always known by the rival, and the incumbent knows this fact. If the incumbent chooses a higher trigger (but still lower than its non-strategic trigger, x in ,) it can enjoy more of the option value of waiting. However, with a higher trigger the incumbent also su ers a higher probability of being preempted by the entrant. Therefore one might expect that, as suggested by the existing literature, the incumbent would strike a balance between the bene t of delaying the investment and the cost of being preempted.
However, we nd that fear of -preemption usually spurs the incumbent i n to acting sooner until its limit { the breakeven trigger, x ic { is reached. That is, a positive probability o f being preempted, no matter how small that probability is, will always make the incumbent act earlier. Only when the incumbent i s s u r e o f g e t t i n g t h e n e w market will it act at a trigger higher than x ic . This nding is formalised in Proposition 3 b e l o w and derived in the proof.
So far we have implicitly assumed that the incumbent's investment has not been triggered since the beginning of the patent game. To complete our discussion, in Proposition 3 we also consider the possibility that the game starts from a state higher than the incumbent's strategic investment trigger. If there is a non-zero probability of being preempted and the initial state, x 0 , is higher than x ic , then the incumbent should act immediately at the beginning of the game. In contrast, if the patent game starts from a state lower than x ic , t h e n t h e i n c u m bent's optimal strategy is to wait for its investment to be triggered, even at the risk of being preempted by the entrant. It is under this scenario that the incumbent m a y be able to learn about the challenger's cost parameter. 
Proof: See Appendix.
The terms on the right-hand side of equation (18) ; K i i xt x is dG(K e jx t ) is the expected net present value of the new patent to the incumbent i f K e < K e and the incumbent a c t s a t x is . (iv) The last term 1i xt r; is the value of the incumbent's existing patent on product 1. We n o w discuss the broad intuition of Proposition 3. First there is the distinction between whether (case A) or not (case B) there is learning. Since competitive fear makes the incumbent act at its strategic Marshallian trigger (unless the challenger is dominated), learning can only happen if the initial level of the state variable, x 0 , is below the incumbent's strategic breakeven point, x ic . In those cases the challenger will enter at a level below x ic only if its non-strategic entry threshold is below x ic (otherwise the entrant w ould prefer to wait till x ; ic to exploit its option va l u e o f w aiting to invest). Consequently, if the challenger does not act, then the incumbent can infer that the challenger must beless e cient than previously thought, and consequently the lower bound of the entrant's cost parameter distribution gets updated to ( ;1) ext (r; ) . Once the state variable equals or exceeds the incumbent's strategic Marshallian trigger, x ic , then the incumbent will act unless it can be sure that there is no chance of being preempted. 19 We show in the proof that a trigger above x ic cannot be credible, as the incumbent can always do better by slightly acting earlier in order to surprise and preempt the entrant. As a consequence, any equilibrium trigger above the incumbent's strategic Marshallian trigger unravels. This is quite a strong result as it means that under asymmetric information the less informed incumbent sacri ces all its option value of waiting because of the fear of being preempted. 20 This is the case even if ex post it appears that the challenger is rather ine cient and the incumbent could have delayed investing well beyond its strategic Marshallian trigger without being preempted. The exception to the rule is the rather extreme case where the incumbent dominates the entrant (i.e., where the breakeven threshold of the most e cient challenger still exceeds the incumbent's strategic Marshallian trigger, i.e., when x ic < (r; )K L e ). In those cases the incumbent can a ord to wait beyond its breakeven threshold up to the point (r; )K L e where the most e cient rm could enter. In an extreme case the challenger can be so ine cient that the incumbent can act at its non-strategic option trigger, x in , just as if there is no competitor. This happens if
For completeness' sake we conclude by brie y discussing each of the individual cases of Proposition 3: 21 19 The probability of the incumbent being preempted is zero if the breakeven threshold of the most e cient e n trant exceeds x ic , or equivalently if x ic < (r; )KL e . 20 This result is in sharp contrast with the complete and incomplete information cases where the stronger rm preserves some option value of waiting. We w i l l r e t u r n t o t h i s i m p o r t a n t p o i n t later. 21 Further details and proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Case A-1: neither the incumbent nor the challenger dominates, i.e. In this case, even the most cost-e cient c hallenger has a Marshallian trigger higher than the incumbent's non-strategic trigger. That is, the challenger does not pose any threat to the incumbent, so the latter will act at the non-strategic trigger, x in . Case A-3: the challenger dominates, i.e. When the Marshallian trigger of the most cost-ine cient c hallenger is lower than the incumbent's strategic Marshallian trigger, it will always be the challenger who patents the second product. However, entry cannot occurat a state higher than x ic , otherwise the incumbent would have a chance to act at x ic . Therefore, the entrant's investment trigger is minfx en x ; ic g. Case B-1: the incumbent dominates, i.e. x ic x 0 < r; e K L Although x ic x 0 , the incumbent will not act immediately when the game is started. Instead, the incumbent should wait until a non-zero probability of being preempted comes into existence or x in is reached, so that the bene tof waiting can beexploited as much as possible.
Case B-2: the incumbent acts at the beginning of the game, i.e. In this case, the patent game starts from a state higher than x ic and the incumbent is uncertain whether the challenger's Marshallian trigger is lower than x 0 . Driven by the fear of preemption, the incumbent will thus act at t = 0. Consequently, if the challenger's cost is so low that x em x 0 , t h e c hallenger should also act at t = 0 (and each player will win the new patent with probability 1=2) otherwise the challenger should give in and let the incumbent win the new patent.
Analysis and Discussion of the Results
In this section we analyse in some further detail the results from Proposition 3. Equation (17) shows that the incumbent's strategic trigger is independent of the probability distribution of the challenger's cost. The probability distribution, G(K e ), is needed only when we are calculating (i) the probability of being preempted by t h e entrant (if x ic is higher than r; e K L ) or (ii) the incumbent's claim value. When G(K e ) is required, we use the Pareto distribution:
where 0 < K L < K U < 1, and 6 = 0. If = ;1, G(K e ) reduces to the uniform distribution over K L K U ]. When is positive, the probability distribution G(K e ) is skewed towards K L . In contrast, the more negative is, the more the probability distribution is skewed towards K U .
In Figure 2 we plot the incumbent's strategic trigger as a function of its own cost, together with the corresponding probability of being preempted by t h e e n trant. 22 Note that a common phenomenon known as the 80/20 rule (i.e., 80% of the probability is concentrated on 20% of the support) can be represented by the Pareto distribution. However, as shown by Equation (17) The lower panel plots the incumbent's probability of being preempted as a function of its investment cost, K i . If x in < r; e K L , the incumbent can fully enjoy the option value of waiting by acting at x in . If x ic r; e K L x in , the incumbent w i l l act at r; e K L to prevent a n y e n try. If r; e K L < x ic < r; e K U , the incumbent faces a positive probability of being preempted. If r; e K U x ic , entry will certainly occur.
As shown in Figure 2 , the probability of beingpreempted is 0 when the incumbent dominates, in which case it will act at either the non-strategic trigger or the lowest possible entry trigger (
, whichever is lower. On the other hand if the challenger dominates, the probability of beingpreempted equals 1. This happens when the incumbent's strategic Marshallian trigger exceeds the breakeven threshold of the most ine cient e n trant (i.e.
(r; )K U e < x ic ). In the intermediate case where the probability of being preempted is strictly between 0 and 1, the incumbent will act as soon as its strategic Marshallian trigger is hit, provided that, of course, the new market still exists.
It is also clear from equation (17) that the incumbent's strategic investment trigger will usually be independent of product market uncertainty ( ). This result is in line with the Marshallian investment rule, but diametrically opposed to the real options paradigm. From Proposition 2 it follows that, if entry occurs, the entrant is able to exploit some option value of waiting. However, since the entrant's trigger is usually determined by the incumbent's strategic Marshallian trigger, it follows that the entrant's trigger is not in uenced by product market volatility. Figure 3 shows a typical case in which the incumbent's rm value is seriously reduced due to the threat of entry. This is illustrated by the fact that the rm's value (given by the`Strategic claim' curve) is only a little higher than the value it would have after entry (i.e., the`Postentry value' curve) but substantially below the incumbent's value when there is only one product (given by the`no new product curve', 1i xt r; ). Hence, even if the incumbent acquires the second product, it will be worse o compared to the case where no second product exists. The reason is that the competitive threat forces the incumbent to adopt the second product ine ciently early in order to protect its market. In particular, if the incumbent's investment threshold is given by its strategic Marshallian breakeven trigger then upon adopting the second product, the incumbent's rm value drops by an amount: ( 2i ; 1i ) x ic r ; ; K i (25) Substituting for x ic the loss is given by: Consequently, the incumbent's value reduction increases with the investment cost (K i ) and the pro t fall that would be caused by e n try ( 1i ; i ). The value reduction becomes, however, less severe as the pro t contribution from the second product ( 2i ; 1i ) rises. If the incumbent has no market share to lose (i.e. i = i ) then the value reduction is zero. The maximal loss in value is the investment cost, K i . This scenario happens when the second product does not generate any new pro ts to the incumbent (i.e. 2i = 1i ). It also follows from the de nition of the strategic Marshallian trigger that upon acquiring the second product at x ic it will be the case that:
( 2i ; 1i ) x ic r ; ; K i = ( i ; 1i ) x ic r ; (27) or equivalently, upon acquiring the second patent at x ic the incumbent's rm value is given by: 2i x ic r ; ;
Hence, at the strategic Marshallian trigger, x ic , the incumbent is indi erent b e t ween acquiring the second product, or becoming a duopolist. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that for all levels above x ic the incumbent strictly prefers to invest rather than being preempted. This implies that the option value created by delaying the investment is always outweighed by the cost of being preempted.
In Figure 3 , the incumbent's`Strategic claim' value is obtained using Proposition 3. The`Non-strategic claim' curve represents the incumbent's total claim value 1i xt r; + h ( 2i ; 1i )x in r;
; K i i xt x in , which consists of both the existing investment on the rst product and the new investment opportunity, supposing that there was no potential entrant. The`Investment payo ' curve represents the incumbent's total claim value, 2i xt r; ; K i , after it has patented the second product. The value of the incumbent's existing investment, 1i xt r; , is represented by the`No new product' curve. Finally, i f t h e entrant has patented the second product, the incumbent's claim value is i xt r; , which corresponds to the`Post-entry value' curve. The incumbent's non-strategic option trigger, x in , is the point where the`non-strategic claim' curve (solid line) smoothpastes to the`investment p a yo ' curve (single dashed line). The value for this trigger, x in , is shown to bearound 0.06. The incumbent's non-strategic Marshallian trigger, x im , is given by the intersection of the two dashed lines, i.e. the`investment payo curve' and the`no new product' curve. Its value is slightly below 0.03. Finally, the strategic option trigger, x is , corresponds to the strategic Marshallian trigger, x ic , and is given by the point where the`investment payo curve' value matches (intersects with) the`post-entry value' curve. The value for x ic is about 0.015. The gure illustrates that the threat of entry and market share loss makes the incumbent i n vest so ine ciently early that it substantially reduces its rm value. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of learning on the incumbent's strategic claim value. Whenever the state variable, x t , rises to a new high,x t , and the challenger does not act, the incumbent learns that the challenger has a higher cost distribution than previously conjectured. This is good news for the incumbent a s t h e probability of being preempted diminishes. Consequently, each time the state variable reaches a new high, the incumbent's rm value moves along the envelope onto a higher value function. 23 Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) also nd a similar learning e ect on the rm's claim value, but in their model both rms gain from learning as both players are incompletely informed about the opponent. In contrast, in our model learning is relevant to the incumbent only. 24 4 Symmetric, Asymmetric and Incomplete Information: A Comparative Analysis
In this last section we compare our results with those in the existing literature on real options and preemption. Existing models have focussed on preemptive entry under complete (e.g. Smets (1991) and Grenadier (1996) ) and incomplete (Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003)) information. The existing papers typically specialise the problem to symmetrical races where two potential entrants contemplate to move into a new market. In order to make our asymmetrical race between an incumbent and an entrant comparable with previous models, we assume in what follows that 1i = i . In that case each rm has a zero payo if it is preempted, and a non-negative p a yo if it wins 23 The envelope is obtained by setting x t equal tox t in the strategic claim value and by v aryinĝ x t , i . e . the envelope is given by V is ( x t x t jx is ). 24 Note that in Lambrecht a n d P erraudin (2003), the`envelope' curve smooth-pastes to the`Investment p a yo ' curve at the optimal investment threshold, while in our model these two curves do not meet tangentially. This di erence stems from their model assumption that the agents have symmetric information (therefore the players follow the same optimising rule given by the smooth-pasting condition). Also note that under incomplete information the optimal investment trigger strikes a balance between the cost of being preempted and the bene t of waiting to invest. The solution is an interior optimum in that the threshold is situated in between the Marshallian breakeven threshold, and the non-strategic option trigger, i.e. some but not all option value of waiting is destroyed. In our paper, however, we obtain a corner solution (the strategic Marshallian trigger) since the cost of being preempted always outweighs the bene t of waiting. This corner solution does not satisfy the traditional high contact (smooth-pasting) condition. This gure illustrates that learning can enhance the incumbent's strategic claim value. Whenever x t hits a new high (i.e. a largerx t ) and the potential entrant d o e s not act, the incumbent learns that the challenger has a higher cost distribution. This raises the incumbent's probability of winning the patent race and consequently the incumbent's strategic claim value shifts along the`envelope' to a higher level. The`Envelope' curve (given by V is (x t =x t x t jx is )) represents the trace of this learning process. The incumbent's claim value is evaluated at three di erent v alues forx t namely: 0:038, 0:043 and x is . the race (consequently the non-strategic and strategic Marshallian trigger coincide, i.e. x jc = x jm (j = i e)). To make the analysis non-trivial we assume that neither rm strictly dominates (i.e. neither rm can act at its non-strategic option trigger without being preempted).
We know that under complete information the more e cient rm typically enters just (epsilon) before its opponent's Marshallian breakeven trigger. Ignoring the epsilon component this means that rm i and e's triggers under complete information are respectively given by: 
Firm i (e) wins the race if x im < (>) x em . It follows that the weaker rm chooses the Marshallian breakeven trigger and sacri ces all option value of waiting, whereas the more e cient rm retains some option value of waiting depending on the distance between both rms' Marshallian triggers (jx im ; x em j).
With incomplete information both rms have to decide on their entry threshold knowing that their opponent's entry cost is drawn from a distribution, G(K). Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) show that each rm's entry threshold is situated between its Marshallian threshold and its non-strategic option threshold, i.e.:
x im x isincomp x in and x em x esincomp x en (30)
Firm i (e) wins the race if x isincomp < (>) x esincomp . The optimal investment threshold strikes a balance between the cost of being preempted and the option value of delaying to invest. This means that under incomplete information both rms preserve some option value of delay.
26
Finally, we found that under asymmetric information the uninformed rm, i, acts at its Marshallian trigger, whereas the informed rm, e, epsilon preempts its competitor, if pro table to do so. Hence, x isasym = x im and x esasym = max x im x em ]
Firm i (e) wins the race if x im < (>) x em . It follows that the uninformed rm, i, always sacri ces its option value of waiting, even if it is more e cient and expost ends up being the winner. The cost of the informational disadvantage therefore corresponds to the option value of waiting to invest.
27 25 In what follows, the subscripts comp, incomp and asym respectively stand for complete, incomplete and asymmetric information. 26 The bounds x jn or x jm (j = i e) are only reached for the extreme cases where respectively the hazard of being preempted is zero or in nitely high. 27 We s h o wed in previous section that if the uninformed rm loses some of its existing pro ts when being preempted (i.e., 1i > i ), then not only the option value of waiting to invest is destroyed but also part of the uninformed rm's existing standalone value. The additional loss can amount u p t o the full investment cost, K i .
The triggers under complete, incomplete and asymmetric information (assuming neither rm strictly dominates) are summarised in the following We conclude from the above table that competition under asymmetric information leads to a more ine cient outcome for the uninformed rm (i) than competition under complete or incomplete information. For the informed rm (e), complete and asymmetric information lead to the same outcome in that the informed rm invests just before the uninformed rm's Marshallian breakeven trigger, provided that this is pro table to do so.
Conclusion
This paper models a patent race between an incumbent a n d a p o t e n tial entrant. Entry into the monopolised market happens by patenting a substitute for the incumbent's present product. The payo of the substitute is stochastic. Asymmetric information is incorporated by assuming that the challenger has complete information about the incumbent, whereas the latter does not know the precise value of the challenger's investment cost but only the distribution it is drawn from. The model allows us to examine the impact of asymmetric information on the incumbent's and challenger's investment decision and on the persistence of the monopoly.
Even though, at rst sight, the investment model with asymmetric information seems to bean intermediate case between complete and incomplete information, we nd that the resulting investment behaviour is more in line with the one that would preva i l i n a w orld of complete information.
We show that a small probability of being preempted gives the incumbent a sucient incentive t o i n vest at the breakeven point where it is indi erent b e t ween investing and being preempted. The informationally disadvantaged incumbent therefore sacri ces all option value of waiting. Furthermore, if entry leads to some dissipation of the incumbent's pro ts then the incumbent will be prepared to destroy some of its existing monopoly value in order to protect its market. We show that this value reduction increases with the incumbent's investment cost and the potential loss of monopoly pro ts. If the second product does not generate any new pro ts when adopted by the incumbent then the reduction in the incumbent's value can equal the full investment cost. If, however, entry does not cause any pro t dissipation then preemptive patenting by the incumbent will not destroy any of its existing value (apart of the option value of waiting to invest).
We show that the entrant will try to`epsilon preempt' the incumbent, if optimal to do so. It follows that the entrant's and the incumbent's trigger are independent o f product market uncertainty (unless one rm strictly dominates the other) and that that the corresponding investment rules are closer to the neoclassical Marshallian breakeven rules than to the real options investment rule. One would therefore expectthat the qualitative nature of previous results from the industrial organisation literature on the timing of technological innovation is likely to remain unaltered by uncertainty and asymmetric information.
Next, we show that if the challenger is relatively ine cient then the incumbent may be able to learn about the rival's investment cost: whenever the pro t state variable hits a new high and the challenger does not act, then the incumbent m a y b e able to infer that the challenger's investment cost is higher than previously assumed.
Finally, we show that if the incumbent has an informational disadvantage compared to its challenger then deterring entry will become much costlier than under complete information, as the slightest threat of preemption will lead the incumbent preemptively to invest and to incur entry deterrence costs. On the other hand, if the incumbent w ere to have an informational advantage (compared to its challengers) then this would put the incumbent in a very powerful position as it would epsilon preempt its rival (if optimal to do so), whereas any rival would end up having to invest at the breakeven threshold, and therefore dissipate all rents.
Proof of Proposition 2
If the entrant can win the patent with certainty (i.e. p = 1), then its strategic claim value is simply the investment payo , e x es ; K e multiplied by the discount factor, xt xes . However, to re ect the possibility that the entrant may not win the game if its cost is too high, the factor p must be included in equation (16) . The value of p follows directly from the derivation of Figure 1 .1 and Assumption 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Case A: W e now consider the situation where x 0 < x ic .
Case A-1: r; e K L x ic r; e K U . In this case, the incumbent can not be certain whether its strategic Marshallian trigger is higher or lower than the Marshallian trigger of a potential entrant.
We will show later that the optimal x is should be x ic in this case. Therefore, K L exis r; K e K U and only the challenger whose cost is lower than exis r; can preempt the incumbent by acting at x ; is . Under the circumstances, we consider the following two possibilities:
Case A-1-a: x ic (r; ) ( ;1) e K L , i.e., even the most cost-e cient challenger does not have a non-strategic trigger lower than x ic . Therefore, the incumbent cannot improve its conjecture about the probability distribution of the potential entrant's cost by observingx t .
By using the payo matrix in Section 2.1, the value of the incumbent is found to be V is ( 
We now prove that the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent is to act at x ic . That is, the strategic trigger, x is , that optimises V is should bex ic . 28 Firstly, w e show that the equilibrium strategic trigger can not be higher than x ic . Note that as long as entry has not occurred, the incumbent has the option of patenting the second product. Upon exercising this option, the incumbent's rm value, V iex ( 
From equation (34), one can easily verify that (i) for any x is , V is (0jx is ) > V iex (0), and (ii) x is > x ic if and only if V is (x is jx is ) < V iex (x is ). In other words, if the incumbent chooses a strategic trigger higher than x ic , then the value of the function V is will be higher (lower) than that of the function V iex when the state variable is 0 28 Note that we restrict our discussion to pure strategies in this paper. A pure strategy for a player is a complete plan of action { it describes how t h e p l a yer will act in every contingency in which the player has to move. A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over some or all of his pure strategies. Therefore, a player's pure strategies are simply the limiting cases of his mixed strategies (see, for example, Eichberger (1993, Section 1.2)).
(x is :) This means that the function curve of V is (x t jx is ) crosses that of V iex (x t ) from above at some state between 0 and x is , because V is and V iex are continuous functions of the state variable x t .
Therefore, if x is > x ic , t h e incumbent's claim value without patenting the second product, V is (x t jx is ), will be smaller than that with patenting, V iex (x t ), for some state lower than x is . This implies that a trigger higher than x ic can not be credible, because the incumbent has an incentive not to keep to that trigger. Indeed, a trigger at x is means there is a probability of G( exis r; ) that the entrant -preempts the incumbent at x is ; . Faced with this risk, the incumbent is better o acting at x is ; 2 , causing the entrant to act even earlier at x is ; 3 , and so on.
Secondly, it is clear that a trigger lower than x ic can not be optimal, since x ic is by de nition the state at which the incumbent is indi erent between beingpreempted and acting. In other words, in a state lower than x ic the incumbent would rather be preempted than patent the second product.
The only remaining candidate for the equilibrium trigger is x is = x ic . For such a trigger the value-matching condition is satis ed because V is (x ic jx ic ) = 2i x ic r ; ; K i = V iex (x ic ): Furthermore, V is (x t jx ic ) > V iex (x t ) for any state x t lower than x ic , so that the incumbent does not have an incentive to act before the trigger x ic is reached. We h a ve t h us proved that x ic is the equilibrium strategic trigger of the incumbent.
Case A-1-b: (r; ) ( ;1) e K L < x ic . In this case, the incumbent's learning happens whenever (r; ) ( ;1) e K L <x t < x ic and a h i g h e r x t is observed. Again, using the payo matrix in Section 2.1, the value of the incumbent i s V is (x t x t jx is ) = The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (35) is the expected present value of the incumbent's loss due to the entrant's entry, which happens at x en if K e < ;1 K e . Similarly, the second term is the incumbent's loss due to being preempted at x ; is if ;1 K e K e < K e . The third term is the incremental value of the incumbent patenting the second product at x is , which happens if x is < x em .
We now prove that the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent is to act at x ic . Suppose x is > x ic K i (r; ) 2i Therefore as the state variable, x t , approaches x is , the incumbent is bettero if it acts earlier instead of sticking with the trigger x is . That is, any x is that is higher than x ic is not a credible trigger. On the other hand, we have shown in Case A-1-a that a trigger lower than x ic is not optimal, so the only possible equilibrium trigger is x ic . Indeed, the value-matching condition is satis ed if x is = x ic , because Following a similar argument to that in Case A-1-a above, one can show that, for any x is such that x is > r; e K L , the claim value V is (x t jx is ) becomes smaller than the exercise value, V iex (x t ), as x t approaches x is . Again the reason is because at x ; is the incumbent's claim value is a probability-weighted average of the exercise value 2i xt r; ; K i (in case the incumbent patents the second product) and the duopoly value i xt r; (in case entry occurs).
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At x is , the incumbent's rm value will be either 2i x is r; ;K i or i x is r; , depending on who patents the second product. Consequently, the incumbent has an incentive to act earlier instead of keeping to the trigger x is , s o a n y trigger higher than r; e K L can not be credible. In equilibrium, the incumbent will set its strategic trigger x is equal to r; e K L . (Note that in this case x ic < x is < x in .) Therefore, no entry will occur and the incumbent's claim value is V is (x t jx is ) = ( 2i ; 1i ) x is r ; ; K i ! x t x is + 1i x t r ; :
Case A-2-b: x in < r; e K L
In this case, even the most cost-e cient challenger does not posea threat to the incumbent, so the latter can act at the non-strategic trigger x in . That is, x is = x in and the incumbent's rm value is V is (x t jx in ) = ( 2i ; 1i ) x in r ; ; K i ! x t x in + 1i x t r ; :
Case A-3: r; e K U < x ic , i.e., even the most cost-ine cient challenger can preempt the incumbent. In a non-cooperative patent game, entry will occur at min x ; ic x en because the incumbent cannot credibly commit himself to acting at a trigger higher than x ic . Although in this case the incumbent cannot patent the second product, for expositional simplicity w e will abuse the notation slightly by stating that x is = x ic .
Case A-3-a: (r; ) ( ;1) e K U x ic In this case, even the most cost-ine cient challenger can act at its non-strategic trigger x en . Therefore, the incumbent's claim value is V is (x t jx is ) = ( i ; 1i ) x en (K e ) r ;
x t x en (K e ) ! + 1i x t r ; : (38) 29 See the right-hand side of equation (33).
